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Abstract 
Philosophy, and the part of it devoted to epistemology or theories of knowledge, were the site of Walter 
Benjamin's early training and writing. Simultaneously, he turned toward a critical conception of experience 
and what he called the linguistic essence of knowledge. This turn manifested itself in a series of writings, 
all of which focused on ways in which knowledge might emerge from the reading of signs. Knowledge of 
fate or character, of the future or the present of persons and languages, is embedded within a theory of 
reading as the noting of signs qua signs. Images appear as the signs for such signs, and the problem of 
reading images becomes the image for a theory of reading. Through readings of selected passages from 
writings dating from the teens through the early thirties—principally "Fate and Character," "Oneway Street," 
"On the Image of Proust," and "Berlin Chronicle"—Benjamin's themes of fate and character, remembering 
and forgetting, are shown to display a fate of reading: the fate at once to see reading, to forget it, and to 
read this forgetting. 
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THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: 
FATE AND FORGETTING 
IN THE EARLY WORKS OF 
WALTER BENJAMIN 
TIMOTHY BAHTI 
University of Michigan 
Our knowledge of Walter Benjamin's writings tends today to di- 
vide into broadly theoretical constructions and intensely discrete. 
often microscopic examinations. This corresponds. no doubt, to two 
aspects of his work and career that were constants from beginning to 
end. Whether, in his earliest writings, he was attempting fundamental 
reflections on the theory of language at the same time that he was 
producing one of the first detailed interpretations of HOlderlin's 
poems, or in his last works, he was reflecting critically on our entire 
tradition's constructions of history as he was also pursuing highly 
specific studies of Baudelaire and nineteenth-century Paris, Benjamin 
seems always to have had it both ways. But Benjamin's "two-way 
street" becomes our divided highway when we seem unable to cross 
easily from a theory of literature or cultural signification to the 
minutiae of a reading of literature or images-and when his quick 
exchanges between theory and reading. become, under our interpreta- 
tions, less well-marked cloverleaves than grid-locked textual 
passages. 
Our divided views and attempted appropriations of Benjamin 
and his work may be construed according to another familiar pattern. 
Benjamin, it is said, started out as a philosopher and became a critic, a 
close reader of literature. And yet the later, literary-interpretive work 
continued to generate both fundamental epistemological critiques and 
universalizing theories of kinds of meaning and representation. The 
philosopher reads literature, and his readers must then read language 
and literature reverting, under his hands and eyes, toward philosophic 
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labor and statement. This difficult exchange is familiar to us in the 
recent and ongoing example of Paul de Man. De Man was also one of 
the very first in this country, in the sixties, to introduce Benjamin's 
work into our discussions of literature, and Benjamin remained one of 
de Man's last texts-indeed, for the text for his last lecture, on 
Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator." So our problem with 
Benjamin, the problem of our bifurcated knowledge of his intertwined 
productions, appears also as a larger present problem in literary 
studies: the question of a theory of language and literature and their 
reading that always departs from and returns to the specifics, the 
"minute particulars" of textual reading, while pulling the latter 
toward a more global understanding. 
A version of Benjamin's itinerary that sketched an uneasy move 
from philosophy to literature would be overly hasty and probably 
unilluminating for those who are not already familiar with his early 
work, for his years of technical study and training in philosophy are 
themselves marked by several shifts in terminology and aim. These 
shifts can perhaps best be approached by noting his changing attitude 
toward what we may call "theory of knowledge." In the rather specific 
senses in which Benjamin uses the terms Erkenntnistheorie and 
Erkenntniskritik-closer to epistemology and epistemological 
critique than to our current and often loose uses of "theory," as in the 
phrases "doing theory" or "literary theory"-one may note the 
stretching and expanding of terms that comes to characterize much of 
his work: he uses the terms, and criticizes and extends them in his 
usage. Much could be learned from a sustained study of his early 
involvement with and gradual reworking of the problem of "theories 
of knowledge": a few introductory and tentative remarks must suffice 
here. 
In his philosophy dissertation on "The Concept of Kunsikritik in 
German Romanticism," Benjamin writes of a theory or concept (of 
Kunst or of Kunstkritik, in his example) being "founded upon 
epistemological assumptions" ("auf erkenntnistheoretischen Voraus- 
setzungen fundiert").' At about the same time he could write to his 
friend Gerhard Scholem, in answer to the question of "how I can live 
with my particular attitude toward the Kantian system," that "I am con- 
stantly at work to make this life possible for myself through insight into 
epistemology."' In both remarks, one notes the foundational, ground- 
ing effort to establish the epistemological assumptions or conditions 
of possibility for a theory or a life directed toward theory. The 2




same passage from the dissertation continues to the effect that, in the 
case of Friedrich Schlegel, these assumptions are "most closely 
bound to extra-logical, aesthetic determinations" ("auf engste in den 
ausserlogischen, asthetischen Bestimmungen gebunden "). At first 
glance, and in isolation, this remark would appear to be of a piece with 
what is called Benjamin's early Kantianism, an interest initiated by 
contact with the teaching of Heinrich Rickert and the writings of Her- 
mann Cohen, and gradually, indeed haltingly, developed across some 
five or six years of actually reading Kant's texts (1912-18). But we 
know that very shortly before writing this, he was also writing the 
devastating critique of Kantian epistemology that was posthumously 
published as "The Program of the Coming Philosophy," in which 
Kant's concept of knowledge is variously criticized as having been 
based upon an inferior, atemporal, mechanistic, empirical or psycho- 
logistic concept of experience, and in which Benjamin calls for a con- 
cept of experience that would be metaphysical, transcendental and 
avowedly religious. When this brief programmatic text closes with an 
invocation of the problem that Kant is said to have allowed himself to 
forget-namely, "the fact that all philosophical knowledge has its sole 
expression in language" -and as it calls for "a concept of knowledge 
gained in reflection upon the linguistic essence of knowledge [which' 
will create a corresponding concept of experience,"' Benjamin is indi- 
cating an itinerary along which certain models and assumptions for 
epistemology are already being forgotten, while problems of lan- 
guage and linguistic "experience" increasingly emerge and shape his 
work to come. 
The years in question, and especially 1917 and 1918, document 
a turn in Benjamin's thoughts on a prospective dissertation topic from 
Kant and history to Jena romanticism and criticism,' and so does the 
dissertation itself rapidly turn from such an initial remark suggesting 
some kind of aesthetic intuition as a ground or foundation for knowl- 
edge, to an exposition of the ways in which problems of knowledge 
(Erkenntnis), intuition (Anschauung), and intellectual intuition are 
embedded in the thinking of reflexivity in the early romantics. The 
dissertation's pages on reflexion and positing (Setzung) in Fichte, 
Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel yield summary statements on 
Schlegel such as these: "Reflexion is no intuiting skein Anschauenl, 
but rather an absolutely systematic thinking, a conceiving Iein 
Begreifen I. Nonetheless for Schlegel it is self-evident that the imme- 
diacy of knowledge must be saved; what was needed for this was a 3
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break with the Kantian doctrine, according to which it is solely and 
uniquely intuitions that guarantee immediate knowledge I einzig and 
allein Anschauungen unmittelbare Erkenntnis gewahren I."' Such a 
formulation preserves a demand for immediacy even as it would indi- 
cate reflexion's break with Kantian intuitionism. When a slightly later 
passage asserts that Schlegel seeks "a non-intuitive, intuition of the 
system [eine unanschauliche Intuition des Systemsj, and he finds it in 
language. . . . Schlegel's thought is an absolutely conceptual, i.e. 
linguistic one lein absolut begrffJ7iches, d.h. sprachlichesl" ( GS, 1.1, 
47), the linkage between a conceptual system, an immediacy of 
knowledge, and a break with intuitionism emerges as language. 
Without entering into the many difficulties of the entire dissertation, it 
can be seen that this paradoxical claim for a "non-intuitive intuition" 
found in language links up with Benjamin's contemporary claim, in 
the programmatic text on the "Coming Philosophy," for "the 
linguistic essence of knowledge." 
A last provisional step may be taken in this selective outline of 
Benjamin's early philosophic writing. As is well known, the 
"Epistemo-critical Preface" to his book Origin of the German 
Trauerspiel rejects both "knowledge"(Erkenntnis)and the pairing of 
the term "concept" with that of "system," in favor of "representa- 
tion" (Darstellung) and "idea." The rejection of "knowledge," as a 
merely acquisitive or possessive category, is anticipated in an earlier 
essay on language, a text to which I will turn briefly near the end of this 
paper; and the argument on behalf of "representation." and 
specifically the self-representation of truth in ideas, is a complex one 
that deserves its separate treatment." Here, a point to note is simply 
that what Benjamin considers the proper object of philosophy. 
namely, the representation of ideas, is said to appear for observation 
(Betrachtung), and specifically to appear as images (Bader): 
Within Benjamin's early philosophic work, then, one may 
discern a move from knowledge via intuitions, to knowledge of knowl- 
edge's so-called linguistic essence (while still preserving a claim to 
immediacy), as well as a move from knowledge as acquisition or 
possession to the observation of self-representational imagery. 
Within his oeuvre, the move was said to be one from philosophy as the 
theory of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie) to philosophic criticism as 
the close but still theoretical reading of literary language and images. 
For our purposes, these shifts in Benjamin's terms and aims may be 
reconstrued as a shift from knowing to reading. all the while along an 4




axis of immediate intuition turning into some other kind of insight or 
observation: in traditional terms, this shift encompasses the 
philosophic notions of aisthesis as a primordial "seeing" or sense- 
perception, and thedrein as a privileged "sight" or siting and insight of 
knowledge. If Benjamin gives up intuition as a means of knowledge of 
language, and gives up any notion of a "conceptual system" as an 
adequate form for language, then what does he come to see in the 
reading of verbal or linguistically constructed images? I am going to 
argue that the entire move from a philosophic theory of knowledge to a 
critical reading of images is, for Benjamin as well as for us, a matter of 
seeing reading. That this occurs along a trajectory from thematic 
treatments of fate and of remembering and forgetting, to structural in- 
sights into the fate and forgetting of reading, it is the project of this 
paper to demonstrate. What began as epistemological assumptions 
(Voraussetzungen) or conditions of possiblity for (any possible) 
theory (whatsoever), turns into the theoretical insight into what is set 
out in advance (vorausgesetzt) for knowledge: insight into its fate. 
What a theory of knowledge sees when it sees its knowledge is its 
Voraussetzung: its assumption, and the assumption of its fate. How 
can Benjamin's theory of knowledge be said, in his early writings, to 
see its fate? The 1920-21 essay titled "Fate and Character" may be 
taken as exemplary. In this essay, he poses the term and theme of fate 
in its relation to possible kinds of knowledge. The essay actually 
begins with what Benjamin calls the common view that would link 
knowledge of character, together with knowledge of events of the 
external world ("das Weltgeschehen," later "die Aussenwelt"), to 
predictive knowledge of fate, character being "commonly viewed" as 
having a causal relation to fate." The essay quickly dismisses the 
causality, and its second paragraph similarly dismisses the ostensibly 
clean conceptual distinction between inner man and outer world: the 
remainder of the essay attempts a reconceptualization of fate and 
character within distinctly different spheres. Some aspects of its revi- 
sionary attempt shall be of interest later in this paper, but here the task 
is first to look closely at what the first paragraph actually says and 
shows about knowledge of fate. 
As if in immediate conjunction with the opening thought of 
character causally determining fate and yielding knowledge of it. 
Benjamin writes that "an immediate intellectual access to the con- 
cept of fate" ("Einen unmittelbaren gedanklichen Zugang zum 
Schicksalsbegriff ") is not possible within our current notions, so we 5
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moderns must evidently accept instead the thought of access to 
character. What kind of access is this? It is a reading of traits (or fea- 
tures), specifically those of the body. Whatever that "immediate 
intellectual access" to knowledge of fate which is denied us might 
have been, this access to knowledge of character through reading is 
linked to the former denial (note that "daher moderne'Menschen sich 
einlassen" ("therefore modern people accept"(), yet it scarcely seems 
any more nearly immediate: it too, after all, is a reading of surface, 
bodily features. And yet immediate knowledge of and access to 
character are then immediately asserted: the sentence continues, once 
again linking knowledge of character and knowledge of fate, "because 
!modern men] somehow find knowledge of character as such before 
them, in themselves 'well sie das Wissen urn Charakter uberhaupt 
irgendwie in sich vorfinden] while the notion of analogously reading 
the fate of a man out of the lines of his hand seems unacceptable to 
them lwahrend die Vorstellung, analog etwa das Schicksal eines 
Menschen aus den Linien seiner Hand zu lesen, ihnen unannehmbar 
erscheint]." This concluding half of the sentence not only relinks the 
reading of character and the reading of fate by way of their contrast 
of their acceptability), but also posits a twofold aspect to 
knowledge of character: it is a reading of signs ("aus den Zugen zu 
lesen"), and yet also knowledge of its object found, as it were, before 
the reading; and within themselves, not in external traits or features 
("sie das Wissen um Charakter in sich vorfinden"). They, the modern 
men, already know character within themselves before they read it 
from without. 
This assertion of mediated knowledge founded upon premedia- 
tional or immediate knowledge is said only of knowledge of charac- 
ter: an analogous relation within knowledge of fate is said to be (or 
appear) unacceptable. Benjamin then heightens this unacceptability: 
"This appears as impossible as it appears impossible 'to predict the 
future' (Dies scheint so unmoglich wie es unmoglich scheint, 'die 
Zukunft vorauszusagen]." The sustained contrast between knowl- 
edge of character and knowledge of fate-the reading of the former, 
the unacceptability of an analogous reading of the latter-is now 
defined according to a second register: the claim for reading surface or 
bodily traits of character because knowledge of it is found before and 
within one appears to invoke a contemporaneous and spatial axis of 
inside and outside, whereas reading from similar features to knowl- 
edge of fate would move on a temporal axis from the present-at-hand 6




to the future. And yet what about the "vorfinden" of knowledge of 
character? Is this immediacy ("in sich") really so atemporal? Indeed, 
an implicit temporal dimension in the knowing and reading of charac- 
ter is immediately made explicit: the contrast between knowing 
character and knowing fate is said to be one between knowing from the 
past and present, and not knowing from the present to the future; the 
"telling -in- advance of fate" ("die Voraussage des Schicksals") is 
subsumed to predicting the future-the impossibility of which is 
suggested-allowing character to appear as "something lying before 
[us' in the present and past" ("etwas in Gegenwart and Vergangen- 
heit Vorliegendes")-and as such, "therefore knowable" ("also 
erkennbar"). One can read between the present and present-at-hand 
and the past. but one cannot read from the present to the saying-in- 
advance of the future. 
It is evident that, in looking at Benjamin's theories of knowledge 
here-be they of knowledge of character, or of fate-one is seeing a 
theory of reading. Another way of posing his question, then, is to ask 
what distinguishes the reading of character from that of fate, for both 
read signs. Yet the reading of character seems to find something else 
as well: not just the traits or features at hand, or on the body, but 
"knowledge of character" ("das Wissen um Charakter"), or even 
character itself as something lying before one. But as the repeated use 
of "seems" or "appears" ought to indicate-Benjamin casts these 
opening sentences under the ambivalent aegis of scheinen and er- 
scheinen-he is about to revise this apparent contrast between the two 
kinds of reading. "But," his next sentence begins, "it is precisely the 
claim of those who profess to predict men's fate from whatever 
signs . . ."-and then what? What follows will be Benjamin's restate- 
ment of reading fate, in such a way that the apparent differences 
between it and the reading of character collapse, while the structure of 
either-or any-reading emerges more clearly. 
One who professes to predict fate from signs is said to be one 
"who knows how to notice it (one who finds before him, in himself, an 
immediate knowledge of fate as such) [der darauf zu merken wisse 
(der ein unmittelbares Wissen urn Schicksal tiberhaupt in sich 
vorfindet)I." The phrasing unmistakably reduplicates the language 
describing an immediate knowledge of character used several sen- 
tences earlier, and thus the difference between the two kinds of knowl- 
edge and reading appears collapsed. But this formulation adds a new 
element: "der darauf zu merken wisse." How does one understand, or 7
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translate, merken here? Those who (claim to) know how to predict 
fate from signs know how to read them-this much has been said 
already-but what do they notice or note, mark or remark? They do 
not notice "fate in itself," anymore than they could notice "character 
in itself": a few lines later, it reads: "like character, fate, too, can be 
apprehended !surveyed' only in signs, not in itself zwar kann ebenso 
wie der Charakter auch das Schicksal nur in Zeichen, nicht an sich 
uberschaut werdeni." "Knowing how to mark or notice it" means 
knowing to notice or remark upon the mark of a prediction: it is 
knowing how to read signs that "speak out in advance" 
("vorhersagen") of their temporal location. The merken is simply, as 
it were, the seeing of signs, but not so much their sheer perception or 
visual sighting, but their observation as signs: as notes or marks. 
Whatever "perception" there might be here is a seeing or sensing of 
signs as signifying (in this case, as signifying ahead of themselves). 
When the sentence then parenthetically adds that such a person 
"finds before him, in himself, an immediate knowledge of fate," what 
he finds before him are signs that speak-or spoke-before their time. 
Noting signs, "reading" them qua signs and thus as significant, is 
"knowing" fate through signs. It is also knowing how to read. 
The "immediate knowledge of fate as such" comes second, not 
only in the syntax of the sentence structure but also in its logical 
sequence. What is seen are signs, signs that speak out ahead of them- 
selves, which means that they must be noted and read. But if the signs' 
speaking in advance is the very constitution of the mode of existence 
of fate in the present, then to have "immediate knowledge of fate as 
such" is to know that one has noted signs qua signs-to have "read." 
in some sense, that they are readable. The object of knowledge here is 
not "fate," but fate in and as signs: as the object of the notation or 
merken, they are "already found" or "found before" one: orfinden. 
The difficulty with what this sentence asserts is in the use of "imme- 
diacy." The signs were there in advance, marked in or on the body - 
they had only to be noted as readable-but the "immediacy" of 
knowledge of fate is then retrospectively posited as already there, as 
the immediate or prior and founding object of knowledge. The diffi- 
cult but real distinction is not between an unmediated seeing-but-not- 
yet-reading and then a knowledge of how to read, but rather between 
reading and then, nachiraglich, knowing how to read.9 The knowl- 
edge that comes with reading signs of fate calls its own production an 
immediacy: it posits a moment or things before this knowledge. But 8




what is "found before" it, are the signs it already knew how to note or 
to mark, because they were read. 
Thus, when the sentence concludes that for those who know how 
to predict fate, for those who know how to mark or note it, fate is "in 
some manner present or-more cautiously said-in place," what was 
formerly a proleptic condition-the future to be predicted-is now 
collapsed into a present condition of signs at hand or in place, and a 
retrospective knowledge of their so-called immediacy. The structure 
of saying-forward or -in-advance ("vorauszusagen")-predicting the 
future-and then seeing, as if "back," to what is at hand, already 
inscribed, is a structure of reading signs that speak forward and con- 
vert, or are read back, retrospectively, as providing the knowledge of 
how to read what was at hand yet in advance of this very knowledge. 
The knowledge so constituted is not the object of some immediate 
intuition (Anschauung), but of an uberschauen, an apprehension or 
surveying of signs. Even the sign or trait "lying immediately before 
one's eyes" ("unmittelbar vor Augen liegen") means nothing, 
Benjamin says, but the interconnection of sign and knowledge that is 
in place only in signs, "laid upon the immediately visible" ("tiber dem 
unmittelbar Sichtbaren gelegen"). The immediacy of knowledge is 
not seen or seeable-in place-except as it is sighted/sited beneath or 
behind the signs that produce or yield the knowledge. 
There are no causal connections here-Benjamin says this 
much-nor any apparently causal sequence of present or anterior im- 
mediacy and then a subsequent or posterior unfolding of a reading or 
interpretation. Fate is read, noted as significant signs, and this is 
knowledge of fate as at hand, present, or in place. It is fate that we 
learn to read, by which is meant both understandings of this proposi- 
tion. It is the concept of fate-foretelling something in advance-that 
we come to read and know when we learn to read. And it is our fate 
that, upon noting signs, we are-as if fated-to learn to read. 
This is a difficult point in Benjamin's thought, and the exegetical 
remarks thus far have perhaps served to occlude as much as they have 
sought to explicate. A turn to another early text may clarify what the 
stakes are for Benjamin and for his readers. In a passage from 
Einbahnsirasse titled "Madame Ariane zweiter Hof links," written 
within a few years of the "Fate and Character" essay, Benjmain tries 
to distinguish kinds of treatment of signs and thereby to reintroduce a 
distinction between fate and character that his opening paragraph of 
the essay had, as a structure of reading, appeared to collapse. To ask 9
Bahti: Theories of Knowledge: Fate and Forgetting in the Early Works of
Published by New Prairie Press
56 STCL, Vol. 11Vo. I (Fall, 1986) 
of the future-as the reader of fate might before its signs-is, 
unknowingly, at the cost of a more precise, more inner knowledge of 
what is coming (GS, 11.1 [vol. 101, 141-42). The passage privileges a 
vitalist, energetic vocabulary unlike that of the paragraph previously 
examined, as it contrasts ("nichts sieht weniger . . . ahnlich . . . als" ) 
being present at the revelation of one's fate with the quick grasp that 
poses ("stellt-) the future. The future is grasped in a quick present 
moment and yields, as its "extract." "presence of mind" ( "Geistes- 
gegenwart"). And this grasping of a future in and into a present 
moment or even a second that achieves or fulfills something ("genau 
zu merken, was in der Sekunde sich vollzieht ") is favorably 
contrasted to merely knowing a distant future ("Fernstes 
vorherzuwissen"). In terms of the temporal structure of the "Fate and 
Character" paragraph, this initial contrast would appear to bring the 
future "zur Stelle" or "in place" in a present, but also separate off and 
denigrate mere "advance knowledge" of a future still separate or 
distant in time. Both involve the encounter with signs -"Vorze ichen. 
Ahnungen, Signale"-as did both fate and character, and in both 
cases these signs are in the body (again as with fate and character), but 
here the activities are given opposed and irreconcilable names: 
"deuten . . . oder . . . nutzen, das ist die Frage. Beides aber ist 
unvereinbar." "Interpretation" gets a bum rap here. "use" a 
glamorized one. 
What emerges rapidly is that this separation of future and present 
is the temporal construal of what, epistemologically, is the condition 
of mediation of knowledge by way of signs: a "word or image" that 
signifies in advance ("prophecy or warning") is a mediating element 
("ein Mittelbares"), but before the knowledge of that future becomes 
such a present sign, it has lost its significance or signifying power - 
namely, a power of greater intimacy or immediacy of knowledge ("die 
Kraft, mit der sie uns in Zentrum trifft and zwingt, kaum wissen wir 
es . . .-). Bringing the future into the present has to happen so quickly, 
in a split second, or it happens not at all: should it establish mediating 
signs. it loses both significance of the future and a signifying impact 
upon the present. The temporal relations of either present signs to fu- 
ture significance, or of present interpretation to any possible linkage 
between present and future, are at stake here. Signs, once in place, 
seem to yield a paradoxical entzdfern: they decipher themselves, but 
the same exteriorizing prefix ent- suggests that they thereby lose or 
alienate their very significance in this signification. 10




Reading, it is clear, is also at risk: to read such signs means to 
read them too late. One kind of collapsing of future into present, in a 
second of immediacy. has been foregone. and another mediation of 
them is too retrospective, too late: it is as if both the present and its 
signifying relation to a future are already past. The point to retain here 
is that all of this laziness and cowardice and tardiness and the like is on 
the part of signs-their interpretation, their mediation, their self- 
deciphering, their reading. What signs do is call attention to them- 
selves qua signs, but this process of signification produces the evacua- 
tion or loss of their significance; their mediating status between the fu- 
ture to be known and the present of that signification dissolves both 
the coming of that future ( it is as if past) and their present significance. 
Signs provoke, call forth interpretation and reading, but their media- 
tion and this understanding signify insignificance and misunderstand- 
ing-missed understanding. 
The retrospective understanding of the knowledge of fate and 
character that was established in the essay of that name is what is at 
issue here: "language which you only now 'too late I understand 
Idessen Sprache du erst jetzt verstehstj." The explicit textualization 
of that essay. with signs before a 
negative light. If life is a book with a text-signs-there is a second 
text or script that glosses the first and emerges only retrospectively, in 
remembering. as the signs missed and the missed reading. This second 
script-signs of their non-signification-is "invisible" ("unsicht- 
bar") until the time of its significance has passed, and "prophetic" 
("als Prophetie") only in retrospect, not toward a still-future future. 
This is bad fate (and also what Benjamin will come to criticize as a 
certain kind of historical reading and thinking). 
These signs seem never visible or "in place," except as 
remembered as once having been invisible, or returned, too late, to 
place ( "zurtickstellen"). What is thereby missed, Benjamin writes, is 
the chance to measure and conquer "the fates" ("Den Geschicken"). 
The collapsed instant of bringing-or not bringing-signs of the fu- 
ture into the grasp of a present is the moment of deciding fate: reading 
it "in advance," or only retrospectively; or rather not reading it, but 
knowing and using it, or only reading it. The messianic impulse to con- 
vert both the future that is coming and this present instant into a Nu of 
"fulfilled now" ("eritilltes Jetzt") would be an immediacy of time. 
and an immediacy of knowledge: "Geistesgegenwart." The naked 
body. like the body on which the signs of fate and character were 11
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inscribed, becomes the image of this immediacy: and this image is 
tellingly located as if before time or history, in "Urzeiten." With this 
instrument, one might once, like Scipio, have diverted "signs" and 
"images" of a coming fate ("Schreckenszeichen. UnglUcksbild hat 
werden wollen") by converting them in and into "true practice": the 
body's immediate, instantaneous grasp of itself. 
Doing something or not doing it and, only too late, reading; im- 
mediacy or mediation; signs grasped or signs interpreted; a future 
determined by a now or a future passing through a mediating but 
ineffectual present and presence of signs: these are the polarities that 
organize this textual passage. It will be clear that forgetting also plays 
a role here, even if not a verbally explicit one. The "remembering" 
("Erinnerung") that, like ultraviolet light, retrospectively exposes 
signs that gloss a book or text of life is predicated upon a forgetting. a 
forgetting to see something invisible, or to grasp something imme- 
diate and immediately. But the remembering is too late: to remember 
is already to have forgotten, and then one might as well forget it - 
forget remembering, that is. Remembering and forgetting reexpose or 
re-present a present that was coming and is no longer: they expose, 
develop, and represent a temporality that "true practice" would 
grasp, pose, and undo. 
Forgetting as well as remembering stand on one side of the same 
set of polarities, of which a present and presence of immediate knowl- 
edge constitute the other side. This juxtaposition brings us to the 
closing image of the passage. Time, presented here as each and every 
dawning day, lies before us "like a clean shirt," an "incomparably 
fine, incomparably tightly woven textile 'tissuel of pure prophecy 
Idles unvergleichlich feine, unvergleichlich dichte Gewebe reinlicher 
Weissagungi." The "happiness" of this present (day), which is also 
that of the immediately coming future-and is furthermore opposed to 
the "Ungltick" mentioned just above-depends on whether we know, 
have knowledge, to grasp the shirt immediately upon awakening into 
time; or conversely, whether we forget. 
The curious twist to this textual conclusion is that putting on the 
shirt would be like exposing our naked body to fate. Putting on the 
shirt strangely forgets that the body is no longer naked, or it 
remembers what it is no longer. To put it another way, not to put on the 
shirt, to remain naked, would be to fail to grasp the tightly woven text 
of prophetic signs which, however, once put on, both covers the 
body's signs and is laid over them, as if a retrospective, but tardy gloss. 12




Benjamin seems to have forgotten whether he wants to start the day - 
to start time-naked or clothed, whether he wants to know the signs of 
time in his hand's grasp or his "center" or his "organism." or to wear 
them on his sleeve in a finely woven text. 
But where can one remember Benjamin first posing this image or 
textual of textured phophecy, and indeed, within an opposition of 
Gluck and Ung luck. happiness and misfortune? It is toward the end of 
the essay "Fate and Character," after he has attempted. despite his 
initial paragraph, to separate off fate from character, the former into a 
sphere of guilt, misfortune, and the demonic world of law ( here one 
sees the valorization implied in the "Madame Ariane" passage), the 
latter into a sphere of innocence, happiness, and a world of nature. 
"Happiness,- he writes. "is . . . what releases man out of the enchain- 
ment of the fates and out of the net of his own 1 fate 1 1 aus der 
Verkettung der Schicksale and aus dem Netz des eignenr ( GS, 11.1, 
174). It is out of this classical image of fabricated fate-chain and 
net-that character then attempts to emerge, albeit with difficulty, for 
the image does not dissolve instantaneously. "The concept of charac- 
ter," Benjamin writes, "will have to rid itself of those traits that consti- 
tute its erroneous connection to the concept of fate. This connection is 
established through the notion of a net that can be tightened by knowl- 
edge at its will into the firmest weave 'eines durch Erkenntnis beliebig, 
bis zum festesten Gewebe, zu verdichtenden Netzes(." "Alongside 
the broad underlying traits," he continues. "the trained glance of the 
connoisseur of men is supposed to perceive finer and closer con- 
necting traits, until what was apparently a net is tightened into a cloth 
Ibis das scheinbare Netz zu einem Tuch gedichtet sell." From chain 
to net to cloth, Benjamin is weaving an image of a shirt. But this is what 
character is supposed to get out of: "In the threads of this weave 1ln 
den Faden dieses Gewebes1 a weak understanding finally believes it 
possesses the moral essence of the character concerned, and has 
distinguished his good and bad characteristics" ( GS, 11.1, 176-77). 
But it is not so easy to disentangle some character from this tightening 
web. Even at the end of the essay, when character is asserted to be 
"unfolded . . . sunnily in the brilliance of its single trait" ("entfaltet 
sich . . . sonnenhaft im Glanz seines einzigen Zuges- ), and to be "the 
beacon in whose beams the freedom of (his( acts becomes visible," 
Benjamin's text recalls the woven textile scarcely put off: "The 
character trait is therefore not the knot in the net" ( GS. 11.1, 178). If 
character emerges from the weave of fate into the naked light of 13
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its own free visibility, why then does the happy man, a few years later, 
get up to be redressed in the tightly woven textile of the shirt? What 
has Benjamin forgotten, or remembered? 
What Benjamin appears to have forgotten is that the concept of 
"character" is a theory of knowledge accessible or "in place" in a 
network of relations between signs and their reading: this may be 
called a text in the particular instance, textuality in the general; and 
this is all in the first paragraph of the "Fate and Character" essay from 
which Benjamin then diverts or turns away. A countervailing turn of 
forgetting and remembering was seen in the "Madame Ariane" 
passage, from grasping the naked, bodily sign away from or in 
advance of a fateful and belated reading, to grasping a finely, tightly 
woven textile and using it to cover such would-be immediacy. This 
whole tissue of fate and character, remembering and forgetting, happi- 
ness and misfortune, and images of signs and textures recalls 
Benjamin's essay "On the Image of Proust," on which Carol Jacobs 
has written finely and densely.'° The essay begins by invoking a 
physiognomics, or sign-reading, of both character and fate: "Proust's 
image is the highest physiognomic expression that the ceaselessly 
growing discrepancy between poetry and life was able to attain."" 
When the next paragraph seeks to describe Proust's work not as of a 
life as it really was ("wie es gewesen ist," with a dig at Ranke's 
historicism), but as of a life as it was remembered ( "erinnert"). 
Benjamin immediately remembers that he is forgetting something; or 
two things, for he immediately adds weaving and forgetting: "For 
here, for the remembering author, the main thing is not at all what he 
lived, but rather the weaving of his remembering. the Penelope-work 
of memory. Or ought one not rather to speak of a Penelope-work of 
forgetting?" Having remembered forgetting, he elaborates and 
embroiders the image of weaving: "is not this work of spontaneous 
memory, in which remembering is the weft and forgetting the warp, 
much more a counterpart vein Gegenstuckl to the work of Penelope 
than its identical image Isein Ebenbild I?" One needs the warp. first 
attached to the loom, before one can have the weft interwoven by the 
shuttle, and the analogy suggests that we have forgetting before 
remembering: we customarily remember only because we have first 
forgotten. 
So here. Benjamin's image has remembering weaving upon 
forgetting. And yet the image then suddenly swerves, to yield 
remembering not weaving, but unweaving or unravelling the textile- 14




work of forgetting, wherein forgetting becomes, as it were, the shuttle 
as well as the loom: "For here the day unravels what the night worked. 
Each morning, awakened, we hold in our hands, for the most part 
weakly and loosely, only a few fringes of the tapestry of lived exis- 
tence such as forgetting has woven it in ourselves I wie Vergessen ihn 
in uns gewoben hat I." This appears to be a far way from Benjamin's 
courageous man's grasping of his finely, tightly woven shirt upon 
awakening. Benjamin here pushes the unravelling a step further: 
"Each day, with purposeful activity and, even more, with purposive 
remembering, unravels the web, the ornaments of forgetting Was 
Geflecht. die Ornamente des Vergessensl." 
Rather than grasping a textile in advance of a fateful forgetting 
and the subsequently belated remembering, the day begins with its 
unravelling-work of remembering, the unravelling of the work of 
forgetting. A text is a weave, Benjamin reminds his reader, and he 
claims there is none "more tight" ("kaum einer mehr and dichter") 
than Proust's. And perhaps, Benjamin suggests, this is because Proust 
couldn't stop writing: the galleys' margins get filled with more text, 
like a textile wherein even the borders are enwoven. But now- 
Benjamin's text continues-this weaving on is not, as above, the work 
of forgetting, but of remembering: "fit isi remembering that here 
issues the strict weaving regulations Idle Erinnerung, die hier die 
strenge Webevorschrift gibt I" (GS, 11.1, 3 I 2). Benjamin can't seem 
to remember whether he has Proust's text (through) remembering or 
forgetting. Or as Carol Jacobs puts it. Bejamin has an interweaving of 
the two (p. 92). 
Why remembering at all Benjamin seems to have asked this 
when he appeared to have had forgetting be both loom and shuttle. 
Proust desires happiness. Gluck. Benjamin suggests. But not by 
emerging out of a net of fateful interconnections that tighten into a 
fabric, nor by grasping such a fine, tightly woven piece of textile upon 
awakening at daybreak. Rather, this recherche is for what Benjamin 
calls "the eternal restoration of the original, first happiness . . . which 
for Proust turns existence into a preserve of memory"( GS. 11. 1.31 3). 
But this turning-into or transformation ( erwandeln) is no more a one- 
way street of remembering than was the initial imagery of weaving by 
remembering and forgetting. What Benjamin calls the "bridge" or 
"gate" to Proust's dream ( GS, 11.1. 3 13) turns out to be Proust's no- 
tion of "similarities," and not just anyone's: "The similarity of one 
thing with another, with which we calculate, and which occupies us 15
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when awake, only skirts the deeper dream-world in which whatever 
happens, never emerges identically, but only similarly -un- 
transparently similar to itself I was vorgeht, nie identisch, sondern 
ahnlich: sich selber undurchschaubar ahnlich, auftaucht1.-12 
Benjamin's claim for Proust's pursuit of happiness has led him, 
and his reader, to this crux of non-self-identical self -similarity, along a 
path on which both perhaps always already were. That is. the attempt 
to correlate Benjamin's disjunctive or disharmonious imagery of fate 
and character, reading and seeing or grasping, remembering and 
forgetting, may have been predicated upon the assumption that any 
one of these was self-identical, so that two or more might then be 
similar. But what emerges from the last sentence about Proust is that 
any one image may be not only non-self-identical, but of an un- 
transparent, impenetrable similarity to or within itself, such that an 
immediate perception or surface-bodily access or grasp to its signs 
would always miss its grasp and displace. misplace, or forget. 
Benjamin gives one more elaboration to this thought. the well-known 
image of the stocking. and it is said to be not a "true practice" of a firm. 
courageous grasp, but the "truth-sign," the "Wahrzeichen" of a 
labile, childish turning-inside-and-out. The rolled-up stocking is both 
outside and inside, container and contained. "pocket" and "present" 
within: sign and knowledge. When a "grasp" then appears ("mit 
einem G riff ") to turn this two-in-one structure into a third thing ("dies 
beides . . . in etwas Drittes zu verwandeln"), into the stocking, this is 
not then the self-identical "real" stocking, but a likeness (specifically. 
an analogy) for Proust's image, which. Benjamin continues, is struc- 
tured like the child's stocking in that a containing-but-unreal "dum- 
my-ego" ("die Attrappe, das Ich") contains a "real life" of memories 
and forgetting and yet is neither one nor the other, but is always 
emptied so that the image can be brought about and in. 
The relation of the child's stocking to Proust's image, or of 
Proust's image to the introduction of the more general "image" that 
appears at the bottom of the paragraph. is neither identity. nor even 
twofold similarity. Each relation has the threefold structure of sign 
(token, likeness), meaning. and the "untransparent" similarity 
between the two-an untransparency or visibility which this paper 
began by addressing as reading. and now turns into imagery. Just as an 
outside surface seems to assure a full interior in the child's stocking or 
in Proust's representation of character and remembering, and yet gets 
turned into a third thing-stocking or image-so did the surface-level. 16




visible noting or marking of signs seem to promise a full, immediate 
knowledge of character, only to turn into a third thing: the reading of 
fate, "seeing" the fate of reading, namely. that we are fated to read, not 
see. So. too, one sees here neither surface nor depth, neither mere sign 
nor profound meaning. neither immediacy nor interpretive media- 
tion, but "a third": the untransparent relation of both in an image of 
reading. 
It may appear that, with these remarks. one is far from the 
problem of forgetting and remembering. The closing image of the 
image seems to present a recirculating relation between three images 
of it: the image as a sign ( say. the sign of fate or character, or the 
rhetorical vehicle for a tenor in the paragraph on Proust); the image as 
meaning (say. the knowledge of fate or character in relation to their 
signs); and the relation between the two which is the reading of 
images, and thus may be called the imagery of reading. But to the 
extent that this is on Proust, remembering is not far behind, and 
Benjamin is not far behind Proust. This paragraph is closely echoed in 
a passage near the beginning of Benjamin's autobiographical Ber- 
liner Chronik. Benjamin is writing of Proust's own role as a model or 
influence in Benjamin's "chronicle" or. as he puts it here, "these 
memories of my earliest city life": 
The renunciation of any playing-around with related possibilities 
will scarcely find a more binding embodiment than that of the 
translation (of Proust' that I was able to produce. Related 
possibilities-do they really exist? They would certainly not 
tolerate any playing-around. What Proust began so playfully 
became a breathtakingly serious business. Whoever has once 
begun to open the fan of memory always finds new wings, new 
segments; no image satisfies him, for he has known Ierkannt that 
it can be unfolded, and only in its folds does the real thing Was 
Eigentliche I reside; that image. . . ." 
The "related possibilities" which this passage invokes may allude to 
what Benjamin called Proust's "non-identical similarities." But the 
transposition (or Ubersetzung) from Proust's image as a stocking to 
Benjamin's as a fan is no fooling around. To have said, as Benjamin's 
discussion of Proust did, that his imagery and all the relations among 
images occur within the transformation ("verwandeln") of existence 
into "a preserve of memory" is, in Benjamin's terms, to say that 17
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the relations among images are the unfolding of the image as the struc- 
ture and action of remembering: there, the stocking: here, the fan. The 
verbal images of "transforming," "emptying out," or "unfolding" 
"bring in" ("einbringen") one thing: the image in the discussion of 
Proust, knowing ("erkennen") the imagery of the fan of memory in 
this passage from Berliner Chronik. In terms of the explication at the 
beginning of this paper, the image of (a theory of) knowledge in the 
unfolding of a temporality from noting a sign of the future to, retros- 
pectively, seeing the knowledge as an anterior one, is neither just a 
claim for immediacy. nor just the display of this first claim under or 
through the texture of a structure of reading, but also "a third thing" 
("jenes Drittes"): the image of unfolding significant imagery, for what 
is known is that no image satisfies, as each is in the folds of an 
unfolding. 
The unfolding of the image does not end-it does not come full- 
circle to a refolding or reinteriorizing, an ultimate Erinnerung-and if 
this is memory in Benjamin on Proust, its imagery occurs against a 
horizon of forgetting in Benjamin on language. What is meant by this 
assertion is that, for all the hopeful imagery of an unfolding of lan- 
guages toward what he calls "pure language" in several early essays 
on language, this sense of a last fullness of the folds is situated against 
a backdrop of real, human forgetting. The early essay "On Language 
as Such and on the Language of Man," for example. has as its famous 
"last word" that "All higher language is the translation of lower ones, 
until in ultimate clarity the word of God unfolds entfaltet I. which is 
the unity of this movement of language ": and this conclusion has as its 
counterpart the methodological avowal, somewhat apologetically put 
forth, that in his statements in this essay. "language is presupposed 
I vorausgesetztl as an ultimate reality, inexplicable and mystical, 
observable only in its unfolding or unfoldedness I Entfaltungl."" But 
as the tension of this translation might suggest-is Enifaliung here the 
dynamic of unfolding or the achieved condition of unfoldedness?-or 
as the semantic tension between "inexplicable" and "unfolded" also 
indicates, this effort toward an image of fully revealed language is 
always situated within and against the condition of human lan- 
guage-in the critique delivered in the essay in question. a fallen. 
inadequately knowing form of language. In Benjamin's "The Task of 
the Translator," an early claim closely echoes the closing statement of 
the essay "On Language . . .": "In I translations I the life of the original 
attains its ever-renewed, latest and most comprehensive unfolding 18




1 Entfaltungl" (GS, IV .1, I 1). But toward the end of this same text, 
this image of ongoing unfolding has a less bountiful counterpart. 
Holder lin's translations of Sophocles are said to be the image of 
translation for all others: "they relate to even the most perfect transla- 
tions of texts as 'does' the prototype to the model kis das Urbild zum 
Vorbild I." And this is, Benjamin continues, as "meaning (Sinn' falls 
from abyss to abyss until it threatens to lose itself in the bottomless 
depths of language." '5 Whether in the rather benign view of unfolding 
or in the rather less benign view of falling, whether in the explicitly 
theological thematic of a God's-eye view or in the more human 
perspective of inexplicability and loss of meaning, this recurrent 
imagery of language's unfolding qua translation is vouchsafed not by 
a goal (Ziel) of verbal re-membering (anymore than in the statement 
about Proust's unfolding of memory), but by the end (Ende) of human 
remembering in a necessarily ongoing forgetting. The relation of 
remembering and forgetting in Benjamin is less one of extremes- 
even of dialectizable extremes-than of a sort of inverse propor- 
tionality, wherein both human remembering and human forgetting 
occur coordinated on the near side of an absolute non-forgetting, 
which latter, however, can never be known, spoken or written." The 
process of remembering-remembering an "original," "pure lan- 
guage," say, or an "original" text through its translations-entails 
increasing forgetting of all actual, material languages and meanings, 
and only what Benjamin calls "an unforgettable" rein Un- 
vergessliches")- what is never forgotten, and therefore never 
available to rememberings-allows for what he knows as our lan- 
guages of forgetting. "Certain relational concepts," he wrote in "The 
Task of the Translator," "retain their good, yes, perhaps their best 
meaning if they are not straightaway exclusively referred to man. 
Thus an unforgettable life or instant could be spoken of, even if all men 
had forgotten them" (GS, IV .1, 10). 
The unforgettable in Benjamin knows no remembering. This is 
not to say that it might not be remembered, or held in memory-this is 
always his messianic gesture-simply that it would not be known. 
The "near-sided" (diesseitige) temporal structure of verbal 
remembering and forgetting is, of course, chastised by Benjamin as an 
inauthentic one ("uneigentlich zeitlich"). As he puts it in the "Fate 
and Character" essay, "The complete elucidation of these matters 
depends on fixing the particular kind of time in fate. . . . This time can 
at every moment be made simultaneous with another (not present). It 19
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is a non-autonomous time, which is parasitically directed toward the 
time of a higher, less natural life. It has no present . ." (GS, 11.1, 
176). 
Benjamin's "authenticity," if one dare risk this term, is to refuse 
to refuse insight into this inauthenticity; but, to paraphrase Paul de 
Man, to spot and site inauthenticity is not the same as to know 
authentically." The relation of times without any present, which is 
what Benjamin's reading and theory of fate expose, is what this paper 
has posed as a fate of learning to read. The fate of learning to read is 
that everything becomes read, even that which has not (yet) any 
present. As Benjamin quoted at least twice from Hofmannsthal (once 
in the piece "On the Mimetic Faculty" I "Uber das mimetische 
Vermogen"1 and again in a draft to the theses "On the Concept of 
History" ( " Uber den Begriff der Geschichtel), "Read what was 
never written [Was nie geschrieben wurde, lesen I..'" This is not 
reading presence or immediacy of knowledge, still less reading the 
Messiah, but reading the absence of reading. This vanishing-point, 
the forgetting of reading and of being read, is of course readable 
throughout secondary literature on Benjamin, and even in some of 
Benjamin's own work, as he pushes limit 
of his imagery. But in the strictest instance, and the most difficult to 
read in its effacement of reading, the injunction is to read Benjamin's 
image of his character in the sketch "Der destruktive Charakter." He 
writes that the "destructive character is a signal" (GS, IV. I 'vol. 101, 
397), hence a sign to be read. Its meaning, he continues, is that "the 
destructive character erases even the traces of destruction Iverwischt 
sogar die Spuren der Zerstorungl" (GS, IV. I , 397). How does one 
read from the sign to the meaning of the sign as its own erasure? This 
would yield "character" -the title word of the piece, after all-as if an 
immediacy of knowledge in noting the absence of reading (for the sign 
"means" that it is erased). But it also yields the trace-the non- 
present, now you see it, now you don't instant-of an erasure even in 
the erasure of all traces. This is the "untransparent" or the non- 
invisible, still-readable relation, the "undurchschaubar" similarity 
between noting images of knowing and remembering character and 
immediacy, and reading the image of forgetting fate and its reading. 20
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16. Cf. de Man, "Conclusions." p. 44: "any work is totally fragmented in relation to 
this reine Sprache. with which it has nothing in common, and every translation is totally 
fragmented in relation to the original. The translation is the fragment of a fragment. is 
breaking the fragment-so the vessel keeps breaking, constantly-and never reconsti- 
tutes it; there was no vessel in the first place, or we have no knowledge of this vessel, or 
no awareness, no access to it. so for all intents and purposes there has never been one." 
Benjamin's clearest statement on the inverse proportionality which obtains between 
human and divine perspectives is his "Theologisch-politisches Fragment." GS. 11.1 
(vol. 4), 203-04. 
17. "The Rhetoric of Temporality." in Paul de Man. Blindness and Insight: Essays 
in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 2nd ed., rev. ( Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 214: "to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be 
authentic." 
18. GS. 11.1 (vol. 4). 213; and 1.3 ( vol. 3), 1238. 22
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